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20 JUL 1971

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From: Intelligence Officer, Naval Special Warfare Group, Vietnam
To: Officer in Charge, Naval Special Warfare Group, Vietnam

Subj: SEAL Intelligence Support (U)

Encl: (1) Establishment of the SEAL Intelligence Office
(2) Photographic Intelligence Support
(3) SEAL Agent Nets
(4) Targetting for SEAL Operations
(5) Post Operation Intelligence

1. (C) Enclosures (1) through (5) are forwarded. The enclosures represent an intelligence guide based on 19 months of experience in intelligence support to direct-action U. S. SEAL platoons operating in the Republic of Vietnam. Certain intelligence support functions described in the enclosures have been assumed by Naval Intelligence Liaison Officers (NILO) in Vietnam, however, since this has varied considerably, the guide has been written as if all intelligence support must be performed by SEAL personnel. Since the enclosures treat all of the major SEAL intelligence support functions, it can serve as a standard intelligence guide for SEALs in other areas of the world by eliminating reference to organizations and enemy designations peculiar to Vietnam.

2. (C) The enclosures represent only an outline guide. There is no substitute for SEAL intelligence training. The SEAL experience in Vietnam has demonstrated the requirement that each platoon contain personnel trained in the various pertinent intelligence disciplines. Consequently, each SEAL platoon should have one person formally trained in each of the following categories:

- a. Human Intelligence Trade-Craft (minimum of one platoon member, preferably one per squad).
- b. Photographic Interpretation.
- c. Hand Held Aerial Photography.
- d. Interrogation Techniques, (preferably with language capability).

Very respectfully,



R. E. MULLEN

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ESTABLISHMENT OF SEAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

1. GENERAL. Liaison with other intelligence collection agencies in the Area of Operations (AO) is the first step in setting up the SEAL intelligence office. This is done in conjunction with the establishment of the SEAL intelligence map plots and files. The targetting process cannot begin until these two tasks are accomplished.

2. LIAISON WITH OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. Visit the U.S. advisors and VN chiefs of each intelligence agency. Divide responsibilities for designated SEAL platoon personnel to visit each of these agencies on a periodic basis once the platoon OINC has established liaison. Frequency of visits are determined by the capabilities of various agencies to provide SEAL target information which may vary with different agencies in different AOs.

a. Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer (NILO): The NILO is the first person visited. He should know personally each of the other key personnel in the other intelligence collection agencies with which the SEALs must establish liaison. The NILO also has Order of Battle (OB) plots and intelligence files which can be utilized in establishing the SEAL intelligence files. Some NILOs have SEAL type target information, especially if he is a counterpart to a Vietnamese Navy (VNN) controlled agent net. Good rapport with the NILO and his counterpart can lead to availability of VNN agents as guides for SEAL operations.

b. Chieu Hoi Center: Visit the U.S. Chieu Hoi advisor and the VN Chieu Hoi Chief. One designated SEAL platoon member with the SEAL interpreter should visit the Chieu Hoi Center daily, if the number of Hoi Chanhs warrant such frequency. Enclosure (4) discusses in detail the exploitation of Hoi Chanhs.

c. Province Intelligence Operations Coordinating Committee (PIOCC) and District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Committee (DIOCC): Visit the Chief, PIOCC and Chiefs, DIOCC and obtain a copy of the Province Black List. Establish rapport for targetting Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), and procedures for identification of VCI killed or captured.

d. U.S. Army 525 Military Intelligence Group: Establish liaison with the Officer-in-Charge of the local 525 M.I. Obtain information on the agent distribution in the AO and possibilities of retasking agents for Essential Elements of Information (EEI) for SEAL targets. Investigate the possibilities of using 525 M.I. agents as guides on SEAL missions, although this is not a normal (525 M.I.) practice.

e. Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU): Establish liaison with the PRU advisor and PRU Chief to determine if agent target information exists in excess of PRU operational capabilities and if targets can be passed on to SEALs. Investigate the possibilities of using PRU agents as guides on

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1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

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SEAL missions. Special permission must be obtained to conduct joint SEAL/PRU operations, and the practice is discouraged.

f. National Police (NP) / Police Special Branch (PSB): Establish liaison with the National Police and PSB advisor to determine availability of SEAL targets. Investigate possibilities of utilizing NP/PSB agents as guides and NP/PSB personnel accompanying SEAL operations as official arresting authority. SEALs may be offered combined NP/PSB operations on targets in contested areas where SEAL combat capabilities are desired.

g. Military Security Service (MSS): Establish liaison with the MSS advisor (usually a 525 M.I. representative) and Chief to determine if the MSS collects intelligence suitable for SEAL targets and availability of MSS agents as guides.

h. Sector S-2 and Subsector S-2s: Establish liaison with Sector S-2 to investigate suitability of Sector intelligence for SEAL targets and obtain Sector policy on length of time detainees and POWs captured by SEALs can remain in SEAL and NILO custody for target exploitation. Establish liaison with subsector S-2s and district advisors for targetting information.

3. ESTABLISHMENT OF SEAL INTELLIGENCE FILES. SEAL intelligence files consist of intelligence reports, Order of Battle (OB) and infiltration / commo-liaison routes maps, target maps, aerial photography coverage maps, agent dossiers, and card files on Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), and detainees and POWs.

a. Order of Battle and Infiltration / Commo-Liaison Route Map: Basic OB and infiltration route information can be obtained from the NILO and the Sector S-2. Once this information is obtained, it is plotted on a map of the AO. All subsequent information is plotted on this map with number references to filed intelligence reports.

b. Target Map: Potential SEAL target information should be plotted on a map of the AO to determine target concentrations and agent reporting distribution. Once plotted, this information provides indications of areas on which aerial photographic coverage should be ordered. The map should contain a map pin or dot with a target reference number. This number refers to a 3" x 5" card which contains a brief description of the target, date of information, source, and intelligence report number which refers to the filed intelligence report.

c. Master Aerial Photography Map: A map of the entire AO should be maintained which plots the areas on which aerial photography is held. This map should have areas blocked on which overhead aerial photography is held (see enclosure (2)) and indicate areas covered by hand held photography

d. Intelligence Area Cards: Intelligence on enemy activity is record-

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2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ed on area cards for a history of all reported enemy activity in a particular area, which is checked each time a target is being planned in the area. The information is listed on a 5" x 8" card for each specific area. The areas are divided up in one of three systems: (1) The hamlet system, (2) the VC hamlet system, or (3) the ten grid square system. The two hamlet systems involve dividing the AO into districts, villages and hamlets, with a card for each hamlet. Agent reports often refer to VC names of locations and, thus, the VC hamlet system is preferred. AOs which include large areas of non-populated areas, e.g., plains, swamps, secret zones, etc., should have the ten grid square system. The AO is divided up into ten by ten grid squares, each block being given a reference number (e.g., A-1 through H-10) which is recorded on a map and on a card. Whichever system is used, the area card should include for each intelligence report recorded: (1) Short brief of report, (2) source, (3) date of information, and (4) intelligence report number.

e. Target Personality Cards: A card file on enemy VCI, village level cadre and above, should be maintained. Information from all sources of intelligence reports on VCI is placed on a 5" x 8" card, one card to a single target person. This card should contain the following information:

- (1) Name and AKA.
- (2) Age.
- (3) I.D. card number.
- (4) Position.
- (5) Date of information.
- (6) Location last reported.
- (7) Identifying features.
- (8) Source of info.
- (9) Intelligence report number.
- (10) Brief on activities and modus operandi.
- (11) Color code of classification (e.g., black tape for persons on Province Black List, red tape for legal cadre, etc.).

All subsequent information on activities, change of position, etc., is entered on the card and referenced as to source of information and intelligence report number.

f. Detainee and POW File: A 3" x 5" card file is maintained for all

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3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

enemy and suspected enemy personnel captured by SEALs. The card should contain:

- (1) Name and AKA.
- (2) Age.
- (3) Position.
- (4) Date of capture.
- (5) Disposition.
- (6) Photograph (a full face poloroid photograph, I.D. card size).

The card should be supplemented by a dossier file folder which contains:

- (1) A statement by the platoon corpsman stating that the prisoner has been examined, and whether there are any visible marks or bruises.
- (2) A statement by the platoon OINC recording the treatment accorded the prisoner, including a record of food and water given.
- (3) A statement signed by the prisoner that he was not mistreated in any way.
- (4) A receipt signed by the receiving agency when the prisoner is turned over to proper authorities.

g. SEAL Agent Files: A 5" x 8" card file is maintained on all SEAL casual informants, potential agents, and agents. These cards contain all known biographical data on the source and a history of contacts. Once a SEAL informant is Name Traced for agent registration purposes, a dossier file folder is begun on the source. The folder will contain: (1) a copy of the Name Trace Request form, (2) a report of File Reference Number, (3) a record of intelligence collection tasking, (4) copies of his intelligence reports, (5) a record of action on his intelligence reports, including evaluations resulting from SEAL operational responses, and (6) a record of all wages and payments.

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4

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Enclosure (1)

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PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

1. GENERAL. Once liaison is established with the intelligence agencies and the intelligence files and maps are established, the SEAL platoon should begin to acquire aerial photographic coverage of potential target areas. The aerial photography can be either of the overhead area coverage type, or point photography taken from an aircraft with a hand held camera.
2. OVERHEAD COVERAGE. Plotting of agent information which is suitable for SEAL targets may indicate area concentrations for SEAL operations. Likewise, a concentration of Hoi Chanhs from particular areas in the AO (e.g., base areas, secret zones, VC controlled hamlets) indicate areas of potential SEAL operations. Overhead aerial photography of such areas should be ordered. The most suitable aerial photography for planning SEAL operations is SPLIT VERTICAL (right and left) photography with a scale of 1 to 4000 or 5000 feet. A reasonable area request is 45 square kilometers.
 - a. Ordering Aerial Photography: The request for area coverage should define the geographic area by four different grid coordinates (e.g., XS600760-XS620760-XS662682-XS645670). Annex A to this enclosure is an example of an aerial photography request form. Normal aerial photographic coverage requests take approximately from one to three weeks from request to receipt of photographs. The normal SEAL operational planning request is Priority II or III.
 - b. Plotting the Photography: Once the photography is received, it is accompanied by a pilot's aircraft track with camera coverage markings. This plot is normally marked on tracing paper with grid coordinate reference points for a 1:500,000 scale map. Placing the trace over this map will indicate the point at which the photographic run began. By comparing the overhead photographs with a 1:25,000 scale pictomap, a frame trace is plotted on the 1:25,000 map. Once the photo frames are plotted, the photographs and frame trace map can be filed.
 - c. Utilizing the Photography: A target coordinate falling within the area of photographic coverage can be found on the 1:25,000 trace map from which the number of photo frame containing this target can be determined. The desired photo frame can then be found in the stack of filed photography. By comparing the coordinate on the 1:25,000 pictomap, and the photograph, the target location can be found on the photograph.
3. HAND HELD PHOTOGRAPHY. Hand held photography taken from helicopters or fix-winged observation aircraft has the advantage of timeliness. This timeliness depends upon the availability of a photographic developing facility. It is most useful for quick response aerial coverage, of areas not covered by overhead photography and for telephoto close-ups of particular point targets of areas covered by overhead photography. As aerial photographic reconnaissance squadrons are withdrawn from RVN, SEALs have had to rely increasingly on their own hand held photographic coverage.

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1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (2)

SEAL acquisition of expertise in hand held photography provides capabilities for operating in countries where photographic reconnaissance assets are nonexistent.

a. Taking Hand Held Photography: A 35mm quality single lens reflex camera should be used for hand held photography. A 40mm to 50mm lens and a 200mm telephoto lens should be available. The 40-50mm lens is for area coverage and the 200mm lens is for close-up views of point targets (e.g., a specific hut, bunker, etc.). Prior to the flight, the pilot should be given a flight path on a map of the target area and told the desired flight altitude. For both lenses, 800 to 1,000 feet is the most desirable altitude for SEAL hand held photography. The camera speed should be set at a 500th or 1,000th of a second, the focal length on infinity, and exposure setting depending upon light conditions. Once in the air, close to the target area, select a prominent geographical feature (e.g., the mouth of a stream, a road and bridge, Y of a stream, etc.) and begin photographing from that point until past the target. In order to obtain a continuous strip of photographic coverage, take the photographs in quick succession, holding the camera at a fixed position with a point on one side of the view finder on the other side of the view finder for the next exposure. This enables one to find all the geographic coordinates on the photographs with the aid of a pictomap. If a 200mm close up photograph of the target is desired, return to the target area and take photographs of the target in quick succession, moving the camera to continually have the target in the center of the view finder.

b. Plotting and Filing Hand Held Photography: The first frame should contain a view of the beginning, prominent geographical point, and the coordinates of this point should be marked on the photograph with a grease pencil. By following the flight path on a 1:25,000 scale pictomap, coordinates can be found and marked on each succeeding photograph. The photography should be stored in a folder or envelope and marked (i.e., Set 1). The area of photocoverage should be noted on the Master Aerial Photography Map and referenced with the same markings (i.e., Set 1). Telephoto (200mm) photographs should be filed with the normal (40-50mm) photographs, placed in coordinate sequence.

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2

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CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (2)

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ANNEX A

Aerial Photography Request

FROM: SEAL PLATOON
TO: NAVSPECWARGRUV
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

AERIAL PHOTO REQ

1. DNLV: 15 JUN 71 (Date after which mission would be of no value, normally 15 days)
2. PRIORITY: THREE (Priority 2: 48 hours; Priority 3: 5-15 days; Priority 4: 30-40 days)
3. SENSOR: PHOTO STEREO; KA 38 (9" x 18" frames)
4. SCALE: 1:4,000
5. ADDITIONAL SPECS: MOSAIC QUALITY
6. COORD: XS 600760 TO XS 620760 TO XS 662682 TO XS 645670
7. EEI: OPERATIONAL PLANNING; HOOTCHES, BUNKERS, TRAILS.

GP-3

BT

GROUP-3
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A-1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEAL AGENT NETS

1. GENERAL. The establishment and management of SEAL intelligence agent nets should be the responsibility of one SEAL intelligence platoon member designated as Case Officer. He should have formal training in agent handling techniques. Another platoon member should be assigned as an assistant to lessen exposure of the Case Officer and assume agent management duties should the net expand beyond the capabilities of one person, a situation which also may necessitate the assignment of further assistants. This enclosure outlines the functions of the SEAL Case Officer in the recruitment of agents, agent management, security, agent evaluation, and intelligence reporting of agent-collected information.

2. RECRUITMENT. The first step in the recruitment of agents is the determination of indigenous personnel or groups who have access to SEAL targeting information. The SEAL Case Officer recruits agents through his agent handler, who may be the SEAL interpreter, a Kit Carson scout, or a VN Navy SEAL. The most common categories of personnel who have this access are volunteer informants, Kit Carson scouts, and SEAL prisoners.

a. Potential Agent Groups

(1) Volunteer Informants: Local intelligence collection agencies have a volunteer informant program. This is a reward incentive program to encourage indigenous personnel to bring in information on enemy activity such as caches, locations of water mines, etc. Once SEALs are in contact with volunteer informants, an assessment is made of the informant's potential to collect further information. If the informant provided accurate information and proved competent as a guide, then he should be considered as a potential SEAL agent.

(2) Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) Contacts: The SEAL Kit Carson Scouts should be dispatched to their former VC operating areas for the purpose of eliciting information from their families, former comrades and relatives of VC. The information collected should be evaluated, and the sources considered for agent recruitment.

(3) Ex-Hoi Chanhs: SEALs make frequent contact with a number of Hoi Chanhs during the course of targeting for operations. Many Hoi Chanhs return to their former homes after completion of the Chieu Hoi process and should be considered for their informant and agent potential. Special attention should be given to the agent potential of Hoi Chanhs who have provided accurate target information and have proven reliable as a SEAL guide because most of the assessment process is already completed. Other Hoi Chanhs should not be ignored as potential agents, particularly those who had information of target areas but could not lead an operation because of advanced age or being crippled.

(4) Prisoners: Every prisoner captured during a SEAL operation

GROUP 3
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1

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

should be considered a potential agent. If a prisoner can be induced to volunteer information during interrogation, an assessment should be made of his potential as a guide on an operation (short range goal) verses his value as a potential agent (long range, continuing goal) in place, in the target area. Inducement to act as an agent centers upon personal freedom against confinement in prison, together with monetary reward. Should the prisoner agree to provide information as a SEAL informant, a cover story must be provided to explain his absence or, if his capture was known, his release.

b. Name Trace and Registration Action: Once a SEAL informant is considered as a potential agent he must be Name Traced and registered. An Informant Utilization Proposal (IUP) is later submitted on agents who have reported consistently for two months.

(1) Name Trace Action: A Name Trace Request (NTR) form is submitted on all potential agents (see Annex A, Appendix 1 of this enclosure). The purpose of the NTR is to check the source central register to determine if the subject is already registered to another agency, or if derogatory information is held. Although a nonderogatory name trace result does not guarantee the reliability or loyalty of a source, this service does provide a minimal degree of security protection. All items on the NTR form must be answered accurately and completely. Ensure that all locations, such as place of birth and residences, are accurately identified by village, district and province.

(2) Registration Action: A Registration Request is accomplished by checking the appropriate box on the NTR form (Annex A, Appendix 1). The Registration Request is made on all persons who will be utilized as SEAL agents. This request establishes the SEAL platoon's "operational interest" (OI) on an individual and registers him as such at the source central registry. Once the NTR form, with the registration request block checked, is received by higher headquarters, the SEAL platoon will be provided by priority message a File Reference Number which is assigned to the source (see Annex A, Appendix 2 of this enclosure). All further correspondence and reference to the subject source will be by File Reference Number, and the name of the source will not be used again. When the source central registry completes the security check and registration of the source, the SEAL platoon will be provided with an agent Code Number by form letter (Annex A, Appendix 3). The Code Number replaces the File Reference Number and is used in all further reference to the source.

c. Informant Utilization Proposal (IUP): Once an agent is Name Traced and registered, an IUP is completed and submitted to higher headquarters when the agent has reported regularly and received payments for his reporting. Therefore, the SEAL Case Officer will submit the IUP (Annex A, Appendix 4) on SEAL agents who have reported and received payments for a period of two months and have future reporting potential.

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2

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

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3. AGENT MANAGEMENT. Once the recruitment process is completed, the SEAL Case Officer must concern himself with agent management. Through his Agent Handler (Interpreter, KCS, or VNN SEAL), this involves agent training, agent communications and funding. Agent management also concerns establishing agent nets through further recruitment of his agent's subsources.

a. Agent Training: The SEAL Case Officer supervises his Agent Handler's training of agents. The agent must be thoroughly trained in reporting, so his information reports will be accurate and complete to the degree that SEAL operations can be planned on his reports. Therefore, the agent's reports should be sufficient to complete one of the SEAL target forms (Annex A of enclosure (4)). Next, the agent must be trained in communications, personal and nonpersonal, in order to forward his reports in the most secure manner.

b. Agent Communications: The SEAL Case Officer communicates with his agents through his Agent Handler. His Agent Handler communicates with the SEAL agents through personal meetings or through drops.

(1) Personal Meetings: Personal contact should be kept at a minimum and most communications should be through nonpersonal contact. However, there are several situations which require a personal meeting between the agent and the agent handler, such as face to face questioning for operational planning of a SEAL target. Meeting places should be at locations which are natural (a restaurant, bar, or market place) for the parties involved, and a cover story, explaining why they are meeting, should be prepared in advance in case of accidental compromise. The SEAL Case Officer himself should not meet the agent unless absolutely necessary, such as to pick up the agent when it has been decided to use him as a guide for an operation. In such cases, the Case Officer should meet the agent in a "safe house". All guide instructions should be given to the agent at the safe house and he should never be brought to or exposed at the SEAL headquarters. SEALs may request and receive rental funds for a safe house by completing and submitting to higher headquarters a Safe House Request form (see Annex B, Appendix 1 of this enclosure).

(2) Drops: There are two means of communication between an agent and his handler which avoid direct personal meetings; these are the dead drop and the live drop.

(a) Dead Drops are hiding places known to the agent and the agent handler. These hiding places can be used to deposit agent instructions and receive agent reports. Dead drop locations must be carefully selected to avoid detection, especially by curious children, and must be in an area where the persons servicing the drop can develop a plausible cover story for being there. Several dead drop locations should be established for each agent with which the agent handler communicates. Agents who report frequently can load and service their various dead drops on a planned periodic basis. Agents reporting infrequently should be instructed

◀ GROUP 3 ▶

3
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

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to signal the loading of a dead drop (e.g., a chalk mark on the village gate, etc.). Annex B, Appendix 2 of this enclosure is a Dead Drop Report form; this form should be submitted by the agent handler to the SEAL Case Officer and filed in the agent's dossier; it is not submitted to higher headquarters. Dead drops are the most secure and frequently used means of agent communications.

(b) Live Drops are trusted persons who are at fixed locations and are used to pass information from agents to agent handlers, and vice versa. Persons under consideration for performing the function of a live drop must be assessed and recruited just like a potential agent. They must be persons performing employment at locations allowing personal contact by an agent and an agent handler, such as tailors, taxi drivers, sampan repairmen, restaurant and bar keepers, etc. One live drop should not be used for more than one agent or agent net. Live drops are less secure than dead drops because another person is involved, but are necessary, particularly for emergency situations (i.e., the need for an immediate personal meeting).

c. Agent Funding: Intelligence funds are available to SEAL platoons for use in paying agents. Rules for utilizing intelligence funds for agent payments are available to SEAL platoon leaders in the form of current instructions issued by higher headquarters. Normally, agents should be paid low monthly salaries, if any, with bonuses for production.

d. Agent Nets: Agents who have proven reliable should be encouraged to recruit subsources. Subsources who report continually should be registered as agents. Since contact with these subsources is maintained through the original agent, he becomes a Principal Agent (PA) of an agent net. If the PA recruits more than three agents, then he should divide up his net into cells of three agents per cell. This compartmentalization is for security purposes; should the enemy "double" one of your agents, he may only compromise one cell. If the PA should develop more than three cells in the agent net, another trusted agent in the network should be established as PA of the new cell (fourth cell) with direct communications to the Agent Handler. This is done for security purposes, but also to salvage some of the net should something happen to the original PA (e.g., killed or drafted).

4. SECURITY. Sound communications, secure meeting places, safe houses, and compartmentalization of agent nets are areas of security already discussed. In addition, there are other techniques available which contribute to the security of the SEAL agent effort. SEALs should employ surveillance and countersurveillance procedures in all agent contacts, and take advantage of polygraph examination services when required.

a. Surveillance and Countersurveillance: SEALs should instruct indigenous platoon members such as KCS and VNN SEALs in surveillance techniques. Then the SEAL Case Officer can use them to observe agents to de-

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4

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CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

termine if they actually did tasks assigned them (paper-milling), monitor the activities of live drop personnel (traitorous conduct), observe agents in loading and servicing dead drops (professionalism), observe safe houses (enemy activity), etc. These same persons should be used in countersurveillance for the physical safety of the Agent Handler and SEAL Case Officer. Thus, they should be armed and practice countersurveillance on all personal agent meetings and servicing of drops conducted by the platoon's Agent Handler.

b. Polygraph Examinations: If an informant or prospective agent should prove unreliable in character or behavior or be suspected of treasonable contacts, he should be dropped. However, an agent suspected of treasonable contacts who has been registered and has worked as a SEAL agent for a period of time, should undergo a polygraph examination (lie detector test). Such a trusted agent would have knowledge of safe houses, live and dead drops, the agent handler and/or PA, and a polygraph test would be warranted. If the results of the polygraph should confirm the indications of treasonable contacts, the total evidence can be turned over to the police and the agent charged and, hopefully, confined.

5. EVALUATION AND TERMINATION. SEALs are in a situation unique to intelligence collection agencies in that they operate on the information provided by their agents. If the agent cannot collect the targetting information required for SEAL operations, he proves unproductive and his employment as a SEAL agent is terminated. Should a SEAL agent provide targetting information but the operations prove the information false, the agent is terminated. A change in an agent's status must be reported to higher headquarters. If a registered, coded agent is terminated, a Termination Report (Annex C of this enclosure) is submitted. This report must include the reasons for termination and whether "without prejudice" or "with prejudice". Registered agents are normally terminated "without prejudice", which means that the agent is terminated for "nonderogatory" reasons, such as lack of productivity, loss of contact, no longer has access to target area, etc. When the agent is terminated "with prejudice", a complete and accurate description of his unreliability must be provided to ensure that this information is submitted to the Source Central Registry. Terminations classified as "with prejudice" must have definitive derogatory reasons, such as suspected treasonable contacts, fabrication of intelligence, swindling intelligence funds, etc.

6. REPORTING. SEALs should report all agent information which will not be used for targetting for operations. This information is reported to higher headquarters via the SEAL Intelligence Spot Report format (Annex D, Appendix 1). Although of no use for SEAL targets, because of size of enemy forces or lateness (an enemy event that has already occurred), such information may prove of value to Naval Intelligence analysts (see Annex D, Appendix 2 for example). Reporting this information also provides higher headquarters with a record of information reporting by registered agents which is useful in justification for SEAL intelligence fund budget requirements.

GROUP 3

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5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

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ANNEX A

Recruitment

Appendix 1 - Name Trace / Registration Request Form

Appendix 2 - File Reference Number Message

Appendix 3 - Name Trace / Registration Results Form

Appendix 4 - Informant Utilization Proposed Form

GROUP 3

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A-1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (3)

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A

Name Trace / Registration Request

Intelligence Officer
 Naval Special Warfare Group, Vietnam
 NAVFORV Box 25
 FPO San Francisco 96626

SUBJECT: Name Trace Request:
 Trích-yếu: v/v Xin sưu-tra
 Registration Request:
 v/v xin cấp âm số

File Reference Nr.(NT/RA): _____
 Âm số hồ-sơ

1. NAME:
 Họ và Tên
 - a. TRUE NAME: LOC, Nguyen van
 Họ và tên thực
 - b. ALIAS/AKA: "FRED"
 Bí danh
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 14 SEP 1949
 Ngày sanh
3. PLACE OF BIRTH: THANH PHONG (V), THANH PHU (D), KIEN HOA (P)
 Nơi sanh
4. SEX: MALE
 Giới
5. CITIZENSHIP: SOUTH VIETNAM
 Quốc-tịch hiện-tại
6. NATIONALITY: VIETNAMESE
 Quốc-tịch gốc
7. PRESENT RESIDENCE: 80/9 MY HOA (H), AN HOI (V), TRUC GIANG (D), KIEN HOA (P)
 Chỗ ở hiện tại
8. PAST RESIDENCE(S): CHIEU HOI CENTER, BEN TRE, KIEN HOA (P)
 (Các) chỗ ở trước đây
9. PRESENT EMPLOYMENT: MERCHANT
 Nghề-nghiệp hiện tại
10. PAST EMPLOYMENT/OCCUPATION(S): STUDENT - PRIMARY SCHOOL
 (Các) Nghề-nghiệp trước đây VC GUERRILLA (1965 - 1969)

A-1-1

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11. ADDITIONAL DATA:
Chi-tiết bổ-túc

- a. RELIGION: BUDDHIST
Tôn-giáo
- b. POLITICAL AFFILIATION: NONE (EX-VC)
Thành-phần chính-trị
- c. ID/PASSPORT NUMBER: #4449806
Căn-cước/Thông hành số
- d. SPOUSE'S NAME: NONE
Tên người hôn phối
- e. FATHER'S NAME: BONG, Nguyen van
Tên cha
- f. MOTHER'S NAME: HOA, Mai thi
Tên mẹ
- g. OTHER INFORMATION: NONE
Các chi-tiết khác

12. AGENCIES CHECKED IN FIELD: CHIEU HOI CENTER AND MSS BEN TRE
Co-quan dã-chiến theo dõi "NO DEROGATORY INFO"

13. REASON FOR TRACE/PROJECT NUMBER: OPERATIONAL INTEREST
lý do sưu-tra/dự-án số:

SIGNED: _____
Ký tên Collection Team Chief (VNN)
Trưởng Toán Sưu-tập (HQVN)

SIGNED: _____
Ký tên Area Collection Officer (US)
Si-quan Sưu-tập Vùng (HK)

FORWARDED.

SCO, COMNAVFORV

To: COMNAVFORV SCO (N201B) From: OSA/SCS Date: _____

1. A file check reveals the following on above individual (a person of the same name): ___ No Record. ___ No derogatory information. ___ Other information (see below). ___ Of operational interest to another agency. ___ Your operational interest registered as of _____.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A

File Reference Number Message

FROM: NAVSPECWARGRUV

TO: CTU ONE ONE SIX PT SIX PT TWO

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN LIMDIS

NAME TRACE / REGISTRATION REQUESTS (U)

1. (CNF) YOUR THREE NAME TRACE / REGISTRATION REQUESTS WERE SUBMITTED TO COMNAVFORV ON 6 JULY 71. FILE REFERENCE NUMBERS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED AS FOLLOWS:

A. DOAN, NGUYEN VAN: 27-71-CN

B. TU, LE VAN: 28-71-CN

C. THANH, NGUYEN VAN: 29-71-CN

GP-3

BT

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A

Name Trace / Registration Result

NSWGV/2:mcc
5520
Ser: 057
11 JUN 1971

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From: Officer-in-Charge, Naval Special Warfare Group, Vietnam
To: SEAL Platoon

Subj: Name Trace and/or Registration Request

1. Your Name Trace Request and/~~xx~~ Registration Request on:

File Reference Number: 15-71-CN

was submitted on 1 June 1971.

2. A file check on 9 June 1971 revealed the following results:

"No Derogatory Information."

3. Your operational interest was registered with SCS
as of 9 June 1971. Subject's Agent Code Number is _____.

G. K. MORROW
By direction

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX A

Informant Utilization Proposal

Name Trace Action No:

Date:

-
1. (C) CIRCUMSTANCES. (Answer: How did informant come to the attention of the Collection Team?; What was the date of the first meeting between the informant and a member of the Collection Team?; Where was the meeting held?; What was the purpose of the meeting?; Who was the member of the Collection Team who met the informant?; What lies did the member of the Team tell the informant regarding the member's name, occupation, etc.?)
 2. (C) PERSONAL DATA. (Answer: What is informant's physical description (omit if a photograph is available)?; What is ethnic background of informant?; What are informant's former residences?; Has informant ever been arrested (if so, where, when, why)?; Where does informant's family live (father, mother, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles), give hamlet or village, district, and province?; What is informant's cost of living per month?; Where does the informant usually travel to conduct his business?; How often?)
 3. (S) CAPABILITIES. (Answer: If informant worked for an intelligence agency before, what training did he receive?; Where did he work?; Has informant been tested to see how much of his former training he still remembers?; What target (Base Area, Unit, or VCI) does the informant have access to now?; What target would the informant have access to if he were given a mission order?; What lies will the informant tell his family and friends so that they do not know about his intelligence activities?; Why does the informant wish to work for the Collection Team?; What are the weak points in the informant's character (for example, does he like too many women, does he sometimes drink too much, does he like to brag about himself, does he like money too much, etc.)?)
 4. (S) UTILIZATION. (Answer: What will be the informant's initial tasking?; Who will control the informant?; Where will informant be contacted after he begins to work?; How often?; How much money will the informant be paid?; How will we test the informant to be sure that he is truthful (before he begins to work, and periodically afterwards)?; How will the informant be able to contact the collection team should an emergency arise?)
 5. (S) CONCLUSION. (Answer: If the informant should suddenly say that he no longer wishes to work for us, what will we do?; If the informant begins to give us lies rather than true information, what will we do?; If the informant should betray us to the enemy, what will we do?; If the informant serves us long and faithfully, will we give him an additional bonus?; How much?)

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6. (C) FUTURE. (Add any additional comments regarding the ability of this informant to continue working for a long time. Answer: If the U.S. Navy stops working, will the informant be of continued value to the Vietnamese Navy? How?)

Signed:

Signed:

Collection Team Chief

Area Collection Officer

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ANNEX B

Agent Management

Appendix 1 - Safe House Request Form

Appendix 2 - Dead Drop Report Form

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B

Safe House Request

1. (C) DESCRIPTION:

a. Location: (Give house number, street name, hamlet, village, district and province. Also give UTM coordinates of hamlet.)

b. Surroundings: (Describe the safe house - not required if a photograph is available. Describe the houses and country within the surrounding 100 meters of the safe house. Draw a map of the surrounding 100 meters of the house. Draw a map of the surrounding 1 kilometer of the house.)

c. Money: (How much money will it cost to rent the safe house? How much money will it cost to buy the safe house? Who is the present owner of the house - give full name and address?)

2. (C) FUNCTION:

a. Informants: (List all informants who will use this house and how often.)

b. Agent Handlers: (List all agent handlers who will use this house, how often, and the purpose for their use of the house.)

c. Others: (List all other persons who will visit the safe house; for example: the team chief, the advisor, the informant's wife, etc.)

d. Camouflage: (What lies will we tell the neighboring people, so that they do not know about our intelligence mission? If the enemy should capture our informant just as he leaves the house, what lies will he tell to explain why he was visiting the house? What secret sign will be used to tell our informants that it is safe to enter the house?)

e. Justification: (Why do we need a safe house at this location? Why can we not use a safe place - one which we do not pay money for - rather than a safe house? How long will we be able to use this house, before the enemy must surely know about our operation?)

Signed:

Signed:

Team Chief

Area Collection Officer

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B

Dead Drop Report1. (S) DESCRIPTION.

a. General Location. (Describe area within one kilometer of the hiding place. Include type of businesses or homes, social class of the people and transportation systems which pass through the area. Be sure to locate all police and army posts. Include sketch map of this area.)

b. Specific Location. (Describe area within one hundred meters of the hiding place. Include information requested under general location. Every house or building should be identified as to use. Include sketch map which shows all buildings, roads, canals and footpaths.)

c. The Hiding Place. (What does the actual hiding place look like? How large is it? Include distances from distinctive objects so that someone who has never been to the general area can quickly locate the hiding place. Include a sketch of the actual hiding place.)

2. (S) SIGNS.

a. Material Placed in Hiding Place. (What sign shall our informant use to show that he has placed material in the hiding place which must be picked up? This sign must be easy and quick to make. It must be easy for us to see, but cannot be so unusual that the police or the enemy notice the sign and suspect our activities. The sign must be placed at least 100 meters from the hiding place and must not be able to be seen from the hiding place. Remember that sometimes the rain and the wind are very bad. The sign must not be destroyed before we can see it, and know to pick up the material.)

b. Material Removed from the Hiding Place. (What sign shall we use to tell the informant that we have seen the sign and have removed the material? The requirements for this sign are the same as for the sign that the hiding place is in use. In addition, this sign must be at least 100 meters from both the hiding place and the other sign, and must not be able to be seen from either location.)

3. (S) USE OF THE HIDING PLACE.

a. Personnel. (Which informants, and Collection Team personnel will use this hiding place?)

b. Times. (What time of day can material be placed in the hiding place without arousing the suspicion of the people nearby? For example, if a policeman is on duty at the hiding place every day between 0800 and 1600, then we must not go near the hiding place at these times. What is

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the very best time to place material in the hiding place? This might be either when there is a great deal of activity in the area which will conceal our placing of material, or it might be when no one else is around to observe our activity.)

c. Mode of Travel. (What is the best route for the informant to come to the location of the hiding place? Are there bus lines which travel through the area? At what times do they operate? If the informant must walk or ride a bicycle what is the best way to approach the hiding place?)

d. Packaging. (How big a package can fit in the hiding place? Must it be wrapped in plastic to protect it from the rain? What color should the package be so that it will not attract attention while in the hiding place?)

e. Special Instructions. (Describe here any special instructions about the use of this hiding place.)

Approved:

Approved:

Collection Team Chief

Area Collection Officer

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ANNEX C

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Termination Report

Intelligence Officer
Naval Special Warfare Group, Vietnam
NAVFORS Box 25
FPO San Francisco 96626

SUBJECT: Termination Report (U)
Trích-yếu: v/v Phúc-trình chấm-dứt nhiệm-vụ

1. FILE REFERENCE NUMBER (NT/RA): 5-70-CN
Âm số hồ sơ
2. NAME: THAP, Dang van (AKA:QUANG, Tran van)
Tên
3. DATE OF BIRTH: 1941
Ngày sanh
4. PLACE OF BIRTH: Phuoc Khanh (V), Nhon Trach (D), Bien Hoa (P), RVN
Nơi sanh
5. DATE OF TERMINATION: 24 June 1970
Ngày chấm dứt
6. TERMINATION (Check one):
Chấm dứt (đánh dấu X vào một khuôn dưới đây)
 - a. WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Không trở ngại
 - b. WITH PREJUDICE (Unreliable Personality Report Required).
Có trở ngại (Cần có Phúc-trình cá-tánh bất khả tín)
7. REASON FOR TERMINATION: Terminated due to non-productivity.
Lý do chấm dứt:
8. Used as action agent for Seal Operations.

SIGNED: _____
Collection Team Chief (VNN)
Trưởng-toán Suu-tập (HQVN)

SIGNED: _____
Area Collection Officer (US)
Sĩ-quan Suu-tập Vùng (HK)

FORWARDED.

D. M. CHINN
SCO, COMNAVFORS

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ANNEX D

SEAL Agent Intelligence Reporting

Appendix 1 - SEAL Intelligence Spot Report Format

Appendix 2 - Sample SEAL Intelligence Spot Report

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D

Sample SEAL Intelligence Spot Report

NNNNCZCKGC671
PTTCZYUW RHMCSYD0512 1750745-CCCC--RUMUGKA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 240500Z JUN 71

COG-3

FM CTU ONE ONE SIX PT ONE PT TWO

2

TO ZEN/CTG ONE ONE SIX PT ONE

35

INFO RUMUGKA/COMNAVFORV

RUMUSBA/CTG ONE ONE SIX

RUMUGKA/COMNAVSPECWARGRUV

RUMUSBA/SEAL TM ONE DET GOLF

ZEN/NILO NAM CAN

NOFORN LIMDIS

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N L I M D I S

SEAL INTELLIGENCE SPOT REPORT (SISR)

1. VC UNIT MOVEMENT

2. 23 JUN 71

3. 22 JUN 71

4. CAI KEO OUTPOST, 23 JUN 71

5. C 3

6. CASUAL INFORMANT SITED, REPORTED TO COMBAT INTERPRETER/GUIDE.

7. A 150 - 200 MAN FORCE IN 50 SAMPANS MOVED FROM VIC WQ0683 TO WQ0881 VIA WQ 108801 CROSSING BAY HAP RIVER AT 220800H JUN 71. FURTHER MOVEMENT UNK. IDENT UNK.

PAGE TWO RHMCSYD0512 C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N L I M D I S

8. VIC WQ108 801 INDICATED AS MAJOR CROSSING POINT FOR VC. PREVIOUS LP'S VIC WQ078 816 AND WQ 084 820 DURING CROSSING. VC SQUAD MAINTAINS SECURITY ON CANAL GOING NNW FM WQ 108 801.

9. SISR 0-4 CLOSED.

GP-4

BT

0512

TOR/240834Z/31/RDL

240500Z JUN 71

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TARGETTING FOR SEAL OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL. To conduct effective operations the SEAL platoon must have precise intelligence. It is not sufficient to be informed that a target personality, Nguyen Van NGUYEN, visits HIA PHU hamlet twice a week, that ten guerrillas of the 526 Company patrol several times a month from XS 5401 to XS 5906, or that a sapper school is located in the vicinity of XS 3754. SEALs basically conduct three types of operations: the personnel target (body snatch), the destruction of hard targets, and the ambush. Each mission requires specific information. The type of information desired for each of the three basic operations is listed in Annex A, and sources of targetting information should be approached with obtaining as much of this information as possible. It is not necessary that all the information be available before an operation can be launched, but the more information that can be provided, the greater will be the chances of success.

2. SOURCES OF TARGETTING INTELLIGENCE. Hoi Chanhs, prisoners, SEAL agents, other agency agents, and intelligence reports are the main sources of target information.

a. Hoi Chanhs: A Hoi Chanh can provide all the information necessary for planning a SEAL operation if induced to cooperate. If the Hoi Chanh can be induced to act as a guide for the operation, the chances of a successful mission are greatly improved. One SEAL platoon member and the SEAL interpreter should be assigned responsibility for Hoi Chanh exploitation. Annex B, Appendix 1 of this enclosure is an exploitation guide for a SEAL assigned Hoi Chanh exploitation duties; Annex B, Appendix 2 is a Hoi Chanh exploitation guide for the interpreter. These guides are based on a study by NILO Soc Trang, LT D. R. MORAN, USNR.

b. Prisoners: Detainees and prisoners captured during SEAL operations can be useful sources of target information. In the field, under impact interrogation, they may provide immediate information on targets in the area. This is rare, however, and most targetting information is obtained later, at the SEAL base, after extensive questioning. Normally, it is difficult to induce a prisoner to voluntarily cooperate, and information must be extracted piece by piece and is of questionable reliability. There are exceptions, however, and detainees or prisoners can be induced to cooperate when they have admitted to the evidence presented against them and an offer of a better status (e.g., Hoi Chanh) or a letter of cooperation is offered if they agree to answer all questions truthfully and act as a guide on an operation. Often this inducement proves effective compared to a prison sentence. Once a prisoner or detainee agrees to cooperate, the exploitation process is much like that for a Hoi Chanh.

c. SEAL Agents: Next to a cooperative Hoi Chanh, agents and informants paid by, and under control of, the SEAL platoon are the best sources of target information. Because of the control aspect, SEAL agents and in-

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formants can be used as guides on operations. One disadvantage is the security precautions which must be exercised in meeting the source to obtain all the information necessary for targetting, picking up the source before the operation, disguising and protecting the source during the operation, and dispatching the source after the operation. All this must be accomplished without compromising the SEAL agent or informant so that he may be able to return to the target area and collect further target information. This also involves manufacturing a cover story for the source to explain his absence from his normal activities and from the target area during the operation. Since the time, effort and money expended on a good SEAL agent is considerable, all efforts to avoid compromise when using him on an operation are paramount.

d. Other Agency Agents: Agent reports by other intelligence collection agencies are another source of targetting information. By themselves, these reports are of marginal targetting value and target exploitation is much like any other intelligence report on a potential target (see paragraph e., below). However, it is possible that another intelligence collection agency will allow SEAL utilization of their agent sources as a guide on an operation. In most cases, this permission is granted if the target is important enough (e.g., POW operations) or is of direct benefit to the collection agency (e.g., capture of their penetration agent's VC superior, enabling promotion of their agent). The same security precautions and care in avoiding compromise must be exercised in using another agency's source as a guide as that afforded a SEAL agent. Success for such operations, without source compromise, may induce the collection agency to allow further SEAL utilization of their agents as guides more often and for less special situation operations.

e. Intelligence Reports: Besides usefulness for plotting OB and keeping area intelligence files up to date, intelligence reports may be a source of targets for SEAL operations. This is rare, but when the report is explicit and gives an exact description of the target area which can be confirmed by aerial photography and/or aerial visual reconnaissance, then a SEAL target can be worked up. For example:

(1) Intel Rpt.: Three village level VCI and 5 guerrillas concentrate at the homes of SU MIEN and TU KY vic XR 252731 until 2000H to 2100H when they move to guard post vic XR 248732. The guardpost area is booby-trapped, the homes are not. Remain at guardpost until approx 0800H when they move back to their home. These two huts are approx 75 meters SE of the junction of the TAN SAN and TOI SAN rivers; BA NINH's abandoned banana grove is adjacent (eastward) to the two houses. Personnel: TU TANG, Village Security Section Chief, CKC; SAU HONG, Village Military Affairs Chief, CKC; TU KUM, Fin-Econ Section Chief, Mauser; 5 guerrillas: mausers and M-26 grenades.

(2) Photos: An examination of aerial photography shows two isolated hootches at XR 252731 approx 60 meters SE of the river junction. A

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grove of trees are directly east of the two hootches.

An intelligence report confirmed by photography, such as above, is sufficient to present to the SEAL platoon OINC as a proposed target. The photography can be further utilized to pick the insertion point and the route to target.

3. PREPARATION OF THE TARGET FOLDER. Preparation of the target folder begins with the initial target intelligence, followed by an examination of all intelligence files on the target area, an interpretation of the aerial photography, and ends with a briefing and presentation of target materials to the SEAL platoon leader. The amount of intelligence planning varies with amount of information, degree of danger in the area, type of target, and mission. A comco-liaison route ambush requires a few hours planning, whereas a POW liberation attempt often requires days of elaborate planning and photographic work.

a. Initial Target Work-Up: The initial target work-up should be done by the SEAL platoon member who contacted and developed the source. After receipt of the initial target information, conduct a thorough research of all available intelligence held on the target area, i.e., Intelligence Area Cards and OB Map. Provide an evaluation of the source and, if he will act as a guide, an evaluation of reliability. Check the Master Aerial Photography Map to determine if photographic coverage of the target area is on hand. If held, conduct a preliminary photo read-out of the target area, noting whether the initial target information is confirmed, not confirmed, or cannot be confirmed by the photography. Present this initial target work-up to the SEAL platoon leader to find out if the potential target is worthy of an operation and warrants further target work-up. If photography is not held, present the initial target work-up to the platoon leader to learn if the potential targets warrant a visual reconnaissance flight and/or hand held photographic coverage. Whether or not overhead or hand held photography is held, determine if close-up (200mm) photographs are required. Such photographs are often desirable when planning operations against a target hootch to determine location of doors, foot bridges, ditches, etc.

b. Final Target Work-Up: The final target work-up consists of a last minute check of all local intelligence collection agencies to determine if any new information has been received on the target area which may influence the planned operation. Final photo work is accomplished, with the target photo annotated. A section of a 1:25,000 pictomap is annotated to include the target, local OB, local defense positions, known booby-trapped areas, guardposts, and other pertinent information.

c. Target Folder: Upon completion of the final target work-up, the target folder is compiled. This consists of a sheet of paper listing the following:

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- (1) Target: (e.g., BA NAN, District Military Affairs Chief).
- (2) Target Coordinates: (6 or 8 digit).
- (3) Detailed Target Description: (e.g., description of BA NAN's house, terrain around house, etc.).
- (4) Local Security: (booby-traps, guards, guardposts, watch stations, etc., in the target area).
- (5) Enemy OB: (all local, or main force units in the surrounding area who may react to an operation, or parts of which may have slipped unreported into the target area).
- (6) Photo Interpretation Read-Out: (all information from the photos which was learned from interpretation and confirmed information of the source).
- (7) Recommended Insertion Points: (determined from information and photography).
- (8) Recommended Route to Target: (determined from information and from terrain and concealment features learned from photography).
- (9) Source Description and Reliability Evaluation:
- (10) Estimate of Value of the Target:
- (11) Estimate of Risk: (to patrol members and delivery craft).

Accompanying the above target sheet are the following enclosures:

- (1) 1:25,000 pictomap section, annotated.
- (2) Aerial photography, annotated.
- (3) Close-up photography (200mm telephoto), annotated (optional).

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ANNEX A

SEAL Target Forms

Appendix 1 - Personnel Target Forms

Appendix 2 - Hard Target Form

Appendix 3 - Ambush Target Form

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A

PERSONNEL TARGET

1. NAME _____ ALIAS _____
2. DESCRIPTION _____ PHOTO _____
3. LOCATION - COORD _____ DESCRIPTION _____

4. POSITION HELD _____ WEAPON _____
5. TIMES AT LOCATION _____
6. PATTERNS OF MOVEMENT _____

7. NAMES & AGES OF RELATIONS _____

8. SECURITY FORCE _____ WEAPON _____
9. PUNJI PITS/MINES _____
10. BUNKERS _____
11. OTHER ENEMY UNITS _____
12. WARNING SIGNALS _____
13. ACTION BY INDIVIDUAL IN EMERGENCY _____

14. NAMES & POSITIONS OF VC HE SHOULD KNOW _____

15. AVAILABILITY OF GUIDE TO LEAD OP _____
16. RELIABILITY OF GUIDE _____
17. GUIDE CAN IDENTIFY INDIVIDUAL _____
RELIABILITY OF INFO _____
18. MISC _____

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A

HARD TARGET

1. TYPE _____ DESCRIPTION _____

_____ PHOTO _____
2. LOCATION - COORD _____ DESCRIPTION _____

_____ PHOTO _____
3. SECURITY FORCE _____
4. WEAPONS _____ ALERTNESS _____
5. PUNJI PITS/MINES _____
6. BUNKERS _____
7. OTHER ENEMY UNITS _____
8. WARNING SIGNALS _____
9. REACTION TO EMERGENCY _____

10. AVAILABILITY OF GUIDE _____
RELIABILITY OF GUIDE _____
RELIABILITY OF INFO _____
11. MISC _____

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A

AMBUSH

1. SIZE OF ENEMY & DESCRIPTION _____

2. WEAPONS _____
3. MATERIAL TRANSPORTED _____

4. ROUTE _____

5. MEANS OF TRAVEL _____

6. TIMES OF TRAVEL _____
7. SECURITY FORCE _____
8. SIZE & TYPE _____ WEAPONS _____
9. LP'S AT DANGER AREAS _____
10. WARNING SIGNALS _____
11. REACTION TO EMERGENCY _____

12. RELIABILITY OF INFO _____
13. AVAILABILITY OF GUIDE TO LEAD OP _____

- RELIABILITY OF GUIDE _____

14. MISC _____

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ANNEX B

Hoi Chanh Exploitation Guides

Appendix 1 - SEAL Hoi Chanh Exploitation Guide

Appendix 2 - SEAL Interpreter Hoi Chanh Exploitation Guide

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B

SEAL Hoi Chanh Exploitation Guide

1. Contact with a potentially productive Hoi Chanh normally occurs in one of two ways: either the Hoi Chanh rallies directly to an associated unit or base of operations and can be exploited immediately, or the Hoi Chanh must be selected from the Chieu Hoi Center population and be questioned 1-4 weeks after rallying. Each case will be considered separately:

a. Immediate Exploitation: Having a Hoi Chanh rally directly provides the best exploitation opportunity. Usually the rallier is then from a nearby AO and if handled correctly from the start can normally be induced to cooperate before being turned over to District or Province authorities.

Most Hoi Chanshs are very apprehensive immediately after rallying and often simply showing sincere concern for their well-being and readily accepting them as allies is sufficient to dissolve their fears and win their full cooperation. It is generally best to smother a Hoi Chanh with kindness and not begin intense interrogation until he has been fed, shown a place to sleep, and begins to relax. Assigning a Kit Carson Scout or other Vietnamese as a companion and interpreter is helpful and also keeps the Hoi Chanh under surveillance.

Once the Hoi Chanh has been "primed", interrogation should begin in an informal manner. Ask general questions about his background, family, recent activities, and position. Assure him that there will be no reprisal for past hostilities against U.S. or GVN personnel; explain the rewards available if he helps eliminate a VC facility; offer to help bring the rest of his family to a secure GVN area. Remind him that he is now a member of the GVN, that his former friends are now his enemies and are a threat to his safety.

After basic information has been volunteered, refer to the intelligence files. See if activities reported by the Hoi Chanh correspond to information held, check names of personnel the Hoi Chanh should know due to his position or area of operation, pull out cards on significant individuals and note details. Using this information, convince the Hoi Chanh that much is already known about his former unit and acquaintances and that nothing can be gained by withholding or falsifying information.

Tailor the rest of the interrogation to the individual. If he rallied due to mistreatment by his VC leaders, inflame his anger and volunteer to help him get revenge. If he rallied out of fear of U.S. and GVN operations, emphasize the care and selectivity of SEAL operations and urge him to help capture VC leaders and destroy facilities to prevent needless bloodshed which will eventually result from larger ARVN forces moving into the area. Play on his weaknesses, tell him what he wants to hear.

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Convincing a cooperative Hoi Chanh to guide an operation after he has supplied the information is sometimes difficult. Demonstrating the fire power of SEAL weapons, providing KCS uniforms, offering rewards, assigning an American nickname, assuring no reprimand if the operation is unsuccessful are helpful. There is no way to force a Hoi Chanh to lead an operation.

b. Exploitation at Chieu Hoi Center: The Hoi Chanh population of the Province Chieu Hoi Center is a nearly inexhaustible supply of information. However, due to the number of personnel, it is not possible to talk to each of them; because of time requirements neither the NILO nor SEAL personnel can do justice to an exploitation program within the Center. Therefore, use of a well qualified interpreter for Hoi Chanh exploitation within the Province Chieu Hoi Center is ideal. It eliminates the time loss of having every question and answer translated, it permits continuous monitoring of the Center's ever changing population, it is the most productive use of an interpreter's time.

SEAL monitoring of the exploitation program can be limited to weekly reviews of returnee rosters to insure that all significant Hoi Chanh have been met, and follow-up interrogations of Hoi Chanh with hard target information.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B

SEAL Interpreter Hoi Chanh Exploitation Guide

1. PURPOSE

General intent is to develop rapport with returnees in order to elicit maximum usable information from their knowledge of the enemy and to encourage them to serve as guides for SEAL operations. Every effort is made to establish a close relationship between returnees and the interpreter in the hope that they will voluntarily supply all knowledge of the enemy and willingly lead operations to destroy or capture their former acquaintances.

2. SELECTION OF HOI CHANHS

Check daily with either the Reception Office or the Chieu Hoi Advisor Office to see what new ralliers have reported. Jot down the name, serial number, position, date/place of rally of all new Hoi Chanhs from SEAL target AOs.

3. INITIAL CONTACT

a. General Returnee: Returnees are brought to the Chieu Hoi Center by subsector or other agencies, or sometimes report directly by themselves. While waiting to be admitted in the reception office, a returnee is nervous and worried about what will happen to him. Meet him and assure him that we are very glad to see him, that there should be no fear of death, that all hardships and fears are ended, that no one will abuse him as long as he is truthful. Inquire about his health, his family, his name, and wish him good luck. All this is done swiftly without interfering with personnel in the reception office.

b. Selected Returnee: There is little chance to spend time with a selected returnee during his first few days in the Center. The process of initial screening by the Center takes precedence over all other uses. After initially greeting him, try to meet him after office working hours and engage in friendly conversation. Do not attempt to collect information because of his weariness from questioning.

A returnee's most agonizing and annoying period is his first 3 or 4 days as he undergoes lengthy screenings and formal interrogations by Sector, Chieu Hoi, and National Police. Having no priority to interrogate him first and not being in a position to influence the decision on his status (he may be classified Refugee instead of Hoi Chanh and be released from the Center), merely gain his future cooperativeness by winning his friendship. Establishing a close personal relationship during this time assures him that he is not alone, that a friend is ready to come to his help.

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4. PREPARATION

Before beginning interrogation, refer to old interrogation reports of other returnees from the Hoi Chanh's former area of operations and insure to have the right maps, aerial photos, VC boundary over-lays. Check with trusted returnees to find out what the man has already revealed: names of local civilians, location of houses, names of streams, are of great help.

5. PLACE OF INTERROGATION

An unoccupied classroom, an empty carpentry shop, or a space under a tree within the Center are places to conduct the interrogation. Subjects feel more relaxed than in the interrogation room which is shared by several interrogators. A disadvantage is interruptions in the midst of interrogation.

6. APPROACH AND TECHNIQUES

- a. Tell him how glad you are to be able to see and talk with him again, and that you are aware that he has already been asked tiresome questions. Explain to him that you are merely a friend who has come to ask his help and in return will help him.
- b. Assure him that anything he says will be kept secret. No one else will know except himself and your American supervisor. Therefore he need not fear being pressured by other interrogators for additional information on subjects disclosed only to you.
- c. Point out to him that we are alone so that no one can hear what we talk about or see any diagrams drawn.
- d. Illustrate how securely his information will be guarded by showing him that your notes are kept in English so that no one in the Center can read them, and by assuring him that the notes will be shown only to your American supervisor.
- e. If the rallier is uncooperative because he is afraid of being forced to lead an operation, promise him that he will not be forced to go anywhere unless he wants to.
- f. To convince him that most activities of his former organization are already known anyway, ask him a question to which you already have a complete answer from previous interrogations. After he answers, add further information and expand on details.
- g. Explain to him that the U.S. role in Vietnam is entirely different than was that of the French: that the Americans are here on request of the GVN to help the country resist Communist aggression and not exploit it for their own benefit; that the Americans are advisors, helpers, not colonialists. Tell him that the GVN is not a puppet government of the American

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Imperialists as he has been told by the Viet Cong and illustrate this by the situation in the Center; that as an American employee you have neither an office nor a desk, but all GVN agency personnel have full facilities.

h. Mention the abuse of authority, the harsh discipline, the unfair punishment of VC leaders toward their men and civilians. Try to arouse his hatred for individuals or parts of the organization and encourage him to give information which will help avenge his mistreatment.

i. When the returnee becomes reluctant to talk or seems to be getting tired, discontinue the interrogation. Invite him to a coffee shop in the Center with other returnees who have provided information for and guided successful operations in the past. While relaxing, prompt the others to recount their experiences with the SEALs. It embarrasses the man if he remains uncooperative while his colleagues have produced results by cooperating.

7. RECRUITING GUIDES

The main reasons for a returnee leaving the VC ranks are fear of death and escape from hardships. Now he is faced with fear of injury during an operation and reprisal afterwards if unsuccessful.

To get rid of his fears and give him confidence, assure him of how carefully and secretly the operation will be planned. Praise the effective guerrilla-like tactics employed by the SEALs, their dreadful fire power, the prompt fire support provided by boats, aircraft, and helicopters. Briefly explain how the SEALs operate, how he will be taken behind for protection once he pinpoints the target, how his face will be painted to prevent recognition, how he will be given an American name to prevent his real name being used in the field. Stress that if the target is found abandoned or moved, he will not be harassed or troubled in any way.

Assure him of the sincerity and hospitality of the SEALs; that he will receive a warm welcome, good treatment, plenty of food and cigarettes, and a generous reward if the raid is successful.

Guarantee him that the results of his operation will be kept classified in the Center and will be made part of his Personal Record which will give specific proof of his loyalty and will be of value to him after release from the Center.

Some trusted returnees, mostly all previous guides, are encouraged to help persuade their colleagues in the Center to supply usable information. Make it clear that you do not ask them to "spy" on others but to simply let their friends know that you are ready to help them if they cooperate. The most effective technique is for them to reveal their secrets to their friends who will in turn often tell them their secrets. Being prompted by other Hoi Chanhs often makes otherwise uncooperative returnees respond. They ac-

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cept one another more readily than an outsider. Good treatment of Hoi Chanh guides regardless of the outcome of their operations almost insures their services as a persuasion-informant.

9. REPORTING

Prepare the interrogation reports as soon as possible and give them to the SEAL supervisor. The SEALs then decide what follow-up action to take and when to check out a potential guide from the Center for transportation to the SEAL base. It is best not to keep the Hoi Chanh out of the Center for more than 3 days since he may become bored and anxious to complete his processing.

When the operation is complete, a brief report is given to both the Chieu Hoi Chief and Chieu Hoi Advisor for their records. After action reports are important to them and prompt submission helps insure cooperation.

10. PRESERVATION OF RELATIONSHIP

In order to maintain a close personal relationship with the returnees, to monitor the "informant net", and to offer them further assistance, try to see all proven Hoi Chanh at least twice a week. Invite them for coffee, provide cigarettes and pocket money. Try to create such a feeling of gratitude and indebtedness that the Hoi Chanh consider you their benefactor and friend.

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POST OPERATION INTELLIGENCE

1. GENERAL. The SEAL intelligence duties do not end with the preparation and presentation of the target. An intelligence debrief, after a SEAL operation, is conducted to learn the validity and accuracy of the targeting intelligence provided, and to elicit intelligence collected by all SEAL patrol members during the operation. Post operation intelligence also involves the interrogation of prisoners and evaluation of captured documents to obtain further target information, and the reporting of all SEAL generated intelligence to appropriate higher commands.
2. ACCURACY OF TARGET INFORMATION. The first matter of importance in the intelligence debrief is the platoon member's evaluation of the validity and accuracy of the target information. This includes information provided by the source and by the platoon member(s) who did the target analysis (e.g., whether features annotated in the aerial photography were in fact what they were thought to be). This phase of the debrief also contains an evaluation of the source, and, if applicable, his reliability as a guide. This is important in the evaluation of other targets provided by the source.
3. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. This phase of the intelligence debrief is an elicitation of all new information collected by each platoon member during the conduct of the operation. This may be information on unknown trails, rest stations, tide conditions, etc. Such information should be reported in a SEAL Intelligence spotrep (see Annex A of this enclosure for an example). Discussions with platoon personnel about the significance of this information will provide ideas for the Comments section of the Intelligence Spot Report.
4. INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION. The SEAL platoon member who worked up the target should participate in or monitor the interrogation of personnel captured on the operation. His familiarity with the target area best qualifies him to attempt retargetting from information obtained from the prisoner. The same is true for the preliminary document exploitation; by working with the interpreter in his translation of captured documents, he is able to assess and follow through on any targeting information contained in the documents. All new information obtained from prisoner interrogation or document exploitation which will not be used for retargetting should be reported in a SEAL Intelligence Spot Report (see Annex B for an example).

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ANNEX A

Sample SEAL Intelligence Spot Report

(Post Operation)

PTTCZYUW RHMCSDT6414 1651240-CCC--RUMUGKA.
ZNY CCCCC

P 141240Z JUN 71

FM CTU ONE ONE SIX PT ONE TWO PT TWO

COG-3

TO RUMUSBA/CTF ONE ONE SIX

2

INFO RUMUGKA/COMNAVFORV

35

RUMUGKA/NAVSPECWARGRUV

4114

RUMUSBA/SEAL TEAM ONE DET GOLF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SEAL INTELLIGENCE SPOT REPORT (U) Q-2

1. SUBJECT: REST AREA ON INFILTRATION ROUTE

2. DATE OF REPORT: 14 JUN 71

3. DATE OF INFORMATION: 10 JUN 71

4. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: BINH HOA (V) DUC HUE (D) HAU NGHIA (P)

5. EVALUATION: SOURCE-A; INFORMATION-1.

6. SOURCE: SEAL TEAM ONE QUEBEC PLT.

7. REPORT: WHILE CONDUCTING SEAL OPERATION AS NOTED MY 100935Z JUN 71. SEAL SQUAD INSERTED BY SLICK AT COORDS XS 355905 ON THREE SAMPANS. WHILE CHECKING SAMPANS, A SMALL REST AREA WAS FOUND 20 METERS FROM THE SAMPANS. REST AREA HAD FRAMES FOR LEAN-TO SHELTERS AND COOKING UTENSILS AND MANY FRESH TRACKS AND WELL USED TRAILS WERE

PAGE TWO RHMCSDT6414 C O N F I D E N T I A L

LEADING TO AND FROM AREA. ALSO REEDS WERE TIED TOGETHER, MAKING A SMALL HIDING HOLE UNDER THE REEDS.

WHILE INSERTING BY SLICK, THE REST AREA COULD NOT BE SEEN FROM THE AIR. ALSO WHILE EXTRACTING FROM LANDING ZONE AREA WAS VERY HARD TO SEE FROM THE AIR. WHILE ON THE GROUND THE MARSHY REEDS ARE ABOUT WAIST HIGH AND IN SOME PLACES THE REEDS WERE OVER SIX FT. HIGH. IT IS VERY EASY TO HIDE FROM APPROACHING AIRCRAFT IN THIS AREA.

THE SAMPANS WHICH WERE DESTROYED, WERE OUT IN THE OPEN MARSHY PLAINS AND NOT ONE ONE OF THE SMALL CHANNELS IN THE AREA. THE LEVEL OF THE WATER IN THIS AREA IS DEEP ENOUGH TO PUSH A LOADED SAMPAN ACROSS OPEN TERRAIN.

8. COMMENTS: INDICATIONS ON THE GROUND AND PREVIOUS ACTIVITY IN THAT AREA IS THAT THIS REST AREA HAS BEEN USED FOR A TRANSFER POINT FOR CACHES COMING FROM CAMBODIA. THIS REST AREA AND TRANSFER POINT IS A LOCATION FOR OTHER SAMPANS TO MEET AND TRANSFER CACHES TO OTHER SMALLER GROUPS FOR FURTHER SHIPMENT.

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TOR 142038Z/51/JRK

141240Z JUN 71

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ANNEX B

Sample SEAL Intelligence Spot Report

(Prisoner Interrogation)

NNNNCZCKGA570
PTTCZYUW RHMCS DY0511 1750740-CCCC--RUMUGKA.
ZNY CCCCC

P 240740Z JUN 71
FM CTU ONE ONE SIX PT ONE PT TWO
TO ZEN/CTG ONE ONE SIX PT ONE
INFO RUMUGKA/COMNAVFORV
RUMUSBA/CTF ONE ONE SIX
RUMUSBA/SEAL TEAM ONE DET GOLF
ZEN/NILO NAM CAN

COG-3
2
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NOFORN LIMDIS

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SEAL INTELLIGENCE SPOT REPORT

1. SUBJECT: VC UNIT MOVEMENT
2. DATE OF REPORT: 23 JUN 71
3. DATE OF INFORMATION: 23 JUN 71
4. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: ISB NAM CAN
5. EVALUATION: SOURCE C; INFORMATION 3.
6. SOURCE: VC CIA 23 JUN 71, VIC WQ109796; INTERROGATED 23 JUN 71
7. REPORT: A 300 TO 400 MAN FORCE IN 100 SAMPANS CARRYING AK'S AND B-4'S WEARING BLUE UNIFORMS CROSSED THE BAY HAP RIVER VIC WQ081808 HEADING SSE AT 121600 JUN 71. AN 8 TO 15 MAN FORCE ARMED WITH AK'S CROSSES SAME PLACE DAILY BETWEEN 1600-2000H. NO KNOWN IDENT.

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8. COMMENTS: NONE
9. SISR 0-3 CLOSED.

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BT TOR:240830Z 54 RDL

P 240740Z JUN 71

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